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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
LAURA DABLE, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20020096-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals her conviction of two counts of possession or use of a 
controlled substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001), a 
third degree felony, and Utah Code Ann. § 58-38-8(2)(e) (Supp. 2001), a class B 
misdemeanor, in the First District Court, Rich County, State of Utah, the Honorable Clint 
S. Judkins presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996 & Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court correctly rule that Deputy Stacey's affidavit in support 
of the request for a search warrant was based on reliable information from credible 
sources? 
Issue 2: Did the trial court properly find probable cause to search defendant's 
home based on her arrest for possession of controlled substances, her admission that she 
had purchased the drugs in Ogden and stopped at her home afterward and statements from 
reliable witnesses that she had sold drugs from her home on at least two previous 
occasions? 
Issue 3: Was the magistrate's allegedly improper authorization of a nighttime, 
"no-knock" search harmless given that the search was conducted during the day and when 
defendant was not at home? 
Standard of Review for All Three Issues: "'We review the factual findings 
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using 
a clearly erroneous standard. We review the trial court's conclusions of law based on 
these facts under a correctness standard.'" State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, \ 12, 996 
P.2d 555 (quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992)). When reviewing a 
challenge to a search warrant, this Court "pay[s] great deference to the magistrate's 
determination." State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994). Such deference is 
appropriate because "'[a] grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward 
warrants' is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches 
conducted pursuant to a warrant." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)) (citation 
omitted). "[T]he [F]ourth [Ajmendment does not require that the reviewing court conduct 
a de novo review of the magistrate's probable cause determination^] [I]nstead, it requires 
only that the reviewing court conclude 'that the magistrate had a substantial basis for . . . 
2 
[determining] that probable cause existed.'" State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 
1989) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). 
Issue 4: Assuming the trial court erred in finding the warrant sufficient, did it 
nonetheless properly deny the motion to suppress because officers acted in good faith in 
conducting the search? 
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies because neither party 
addressed this argument below and the trial court had no reason to reach it, given the 
court's ruling that the search warrant was not defective. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitutional provisions, statutes and rules relevant to this appeal are: 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-205(1) (1999) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210(2) (1999) 
The Utah statutory provisions are reproduced in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information dated November 30, 2000, with possession 
or use of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony in violation of 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(l) & (2)(e) (Supp. 2001), and possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (Supp. 
2001). R. 1-2. On January 26, 2001, defendant pleaded not guilty. R. 22, 28. 
Defendant waived her preliminary hearing and filed a motion to suppress evidence 
seized from her trailer home. R. 25-44. After briefing and argument, the trial court denied 
the motion to suppress. R. 111-13. 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession or use of a 
controlled substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2001), a 
third degree felony, and Utah Code Ann. § 58-38-8(2)(e) (Supp. 2001), a class B 
misdemeanor. On December 13, 2001, the court imposed suspended prison terms and 
instead sentenced her to serve 30 days in jail and pay fines totaling $1,400. R. 120-21. 
The jail term and fine were stayed pending appeal. R. 98, 100. 
Defendant timely appealed. R. 105. 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Rich County Sheriffs Deputy Dale Stacey had a hot tip. On June 6, 2000, Deputy 
Stacey was contacted by Sheriffs Deputies Kim Clark and Jody Gardner of Lincoln 
County, Wyoming. The Wyoming deputies relayed information from an informant ("the 
Wyoming informant") who stated that Laura Dable (defendant), a resident of Randolph, 
Rich County, was planning a trip to Ogden, Utah, to purchase methamphetamine and 
marijuana, which she was planning to sell in Lincoln County. See Findings and Order, 
R. 111 [a];2 see also search affidavit, R. 18; Deputy's Report, Addendum D. 
This was not the first time Deputy Stacey had heard defendant's name in 
connection with allegations of drug dealing. A little over a month earlier, Deputy Stacey 
1
 The factual posture of this case is unusual because defendant did not request an 
evidentiary hearing or submit stipulated facts. Thus, the Statement of Facts is based on 
the trial court's Findings and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence 
("Findings and Order"), R. 111-113, a copy of which is attached as Addendum B; the 
transcript from the argument on defendant's motion to dismiss, R. 125, a copy of which is 
attached as Addendum C; the Affidavit for search warrant, dated June 7, 2000, R. 14-19 
("Search affidavit"), a copy of which is attached as Addendum D; and the Rich County 
Sheriffs Office Deputy Report prepared by Deputy Dale Stacey, dated November 22, 
2000 ("Deputy's Report"), attached as Addendum E. The Deputy's Report is cited even 
though it does not appear to be part of the record on appeal because it is clear that the 
report was before the trial court when it denied the motion to suppress. See R. 125:14. 
Defendant has also cited the report and attached it to her brief as Appendix H. The State 
will move to supplement the record with the Deputy's Report. The facts culled from the 
above sources are stated in a light most favorable to the trial court's denial of the motion 
to suppress. See, e.g., State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App.1997). 
2
 The record in this case was numbered by hand and the second page of the court's 
Findings and Order is not numbered. Because the unnumbered page is between R. 111 
and R. 112, the State will refer to it as "R. 11 l[a]". 
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had interviewed a man named Threll Orton, who had been arrested in Evanston, 
Wyoming, on charges of selling methamphetamine and marijuana. R. 18, 111; Deputy's 
Report. Orton told Deputy Stacey that he had purchased methamphetamine from a 
woman named "Laura" at her trailer home in Randolph on at least two occasions. R. 18, 
111; Deputy's Report. Based on Orton's description, Deputy Stacey located the trailer 
and determined that the woman Orton referred to was the defendant, Laura Dable. R. 18; 
Deputy's Report. 
On June 7, 2000, Deputy Clark informed Deputy Stacey that defendant had been 
arrested for possession of marijuana and methamphetamine during a traffic stop in 
Wyoming. R. 18, 11 l[a]; Deputy's Report. Deputy Clairk also reported that, following 
her arrest, defendant admitted she had purchased the drugs in Ogden and that she had 
stopped by her trailer home in Randolph before proceeding to Wyoming. R. 18, 11 l[a]; 
Deputy's Report. 
Because defendant admitted she had stopped by her trailer home after purchasing 
the drugs in Ogden, and because drugs had reportedly been sold at the trailer previously, 
Deputy Stacey decided to seek a warrant to search the trailer. In his affidavit, Deputy 
Stacey stated: 
Threll Orton informed your affiant that he had bought 
methamphetamine from Laura Dable at the trailer described in this affidavit 
on at least two occasions. 
On 6-7-00 I spoke with Deputies Kim Clark and Jody Gardner from 
the Lincoln County sheriffs Office. They indicated that they were working 
on a drug case, and that a confidential informant told them that Laura Dable 
was planning on picking up some drugs in Ogden on 6-6-00 and bringing 
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them into Lincoln County to sell. On 6-7-00, Dable was stopped and her 
vehicle searched. The officers located approximately 4 ounces of marijuana 
and 4 grams of methamphetamine. 
Dable informed the officers that she had bought the drugs in Ogden 
on 6-6-00 and had stopped at her residence in Randolph for several hours 
before going on up to Lincoln County. Your affiant feels there is probable 
cause to believe some of the drugs bought in Ogden were left in the trailer 
because there have allegedly been sales made from the trailer to people in 
this county. 
R. 18. 
The magistrate signed the warrant authorizing search of defendant's trailer home. 
Upon execution of the search warrant, officers seized marijuana and methamphetamine as 
well as numerous other items that appeared to be drug paraphernalia. R. 17. 
The defendant moves to suppress all the items seized from her trailer because the 
search affidavit was based on "unverifiable and unreliable" factual assertions made by 
'"untested and questionable informants," which facts were '"uncritically accepted" by the 
magistrate in approving the search warrant. R. 38. She also claimed that the state 
negligently or intentionally omitted critical information that would have affected the 
magistrate's probable cause determination. Id. Defendant also complained that the 
search warrant fomi was not completely filled out by the magistrate and that the 
omissions improperly authorized a night-time, no-knock search. R. 55-56; 125:3. 
Following briefing and oral argument, the trial court denied the motion to 
suppress. The court rejected defendant's challenge to the credibility of the sources of 
information in the affidavit, noting that information obtained from law enforcement 
officers in the course of an investigation is presumptively reliable and sufficient to 
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support probable cause. R. 112. The court also detenriined that any defect due to the fact 
that the warrant was not completely filled out was harmless error. R. 113. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court correctly ruled that the Wyoming sheriffs deputies 
provided information that was presumptively reliable because it was communicated by 
peace officers in the course of an investigation concerning defendant's arrest for 
possession of controlled substances. Although the trial court did not reach the credibility 
of the two informants—Orton and the Wyoming confidential informant—because it 
determined that information provided by the Wyoming deputies was sufficient to 
establish probable cause, the informants nonetheless provided credible, reliable 
information which may also be relied upon by this Court in finding probable cause for the 
search. 
Point II: The trial court correctly found probable cause to search defendant's 
trailer home. Following her arrest in Wyoming for possession of controlled substances, 
defendant admitted that she had purchased the drugs in Ogden and that she had stopped at 
her home before driving to Wyoming. Information from Orton and the Wyoming 
informant indicated defendant was involved in the sale of drugs and that she had sold 
drugs from her home. These facts provided more than enough evidence to establish a fair 
probability that drugs or other relevant evidence would be found at defendant's home. 
Point III: Defendant's claim that the magistrate improperly authorized a 
nighttime, "no-knock" search is frivolous. Whether the search warrant improperly 
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authorized a nighttime, no-knock search is inconsequential given that the search was 
actually conducted during the daytime while defendant was not home to respond to a 
knock. Accordingly, any error was harmless. 
Point IV: The "good faith exception" to the warrant requirement need not be 
invoked here because the warrant was supported by probable cause. Nonetheless, if the 
good faith exception were applied, this Court should find that the deputies who executed 
the search warrant acted on a good faith belief that the warrant was properly issued by a 
neutral magistrate. Thus, even if the warrant were deemed defective, the evidence need 
not be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INFORMATION IN DEPUTY STACEY'S 
AFFIDAVIT WAS BASED ON RELIABLE 
INFORMATION FROM CREDIBLE SOURCES. 
Defendant claims that information from Wyoming sheriffs deputies, Threll Orton 
and the Wyoming informant was unreliable and did not establish probable cause for the 
search of the trailer. Aplt. Br. at 18-24. Defendant is incorrect. Statements from law 
enforcement officials provided in the course of an investigation are presumptively 
reliable. And while information from the informants is not presumptively reliable, their 
statements were still properly relied upon by Deputy Stacey and the magistrate because 
they were corroborated by other known facts. 
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A. Statements of Law Enforcement Officials in 
the Course of an Investigation are 
Presumptively Reliable. 
Defendant attacks the reliability of the information from the Wyoming sheriffs 
deputies as based largely on uncorroborated "heresay" [sic], which established "only" that 
defendant had been arrested and the drugs she had purchased in Ogden confiscated. Aplt. 
Br. at 23-24. This attempt to minimize the importance of the Wyoming deputies' 
information in establishing probable cause for the search is unavailing. 
The principal sources of the information included in the search affidavit were 
Deputies Kim Clark and Jody Gardner of the Lincoln County, Wyoming, Sheriffs Office. 
On June 7, 2000, Clark and Gardner informed Deputy Stacey that defendant had been 
arrested and that marijuana and methamphetamine had been seized. R. 18, 111 [a]. They 
ftirther stated that defendant had admitted purchasing the drugs in Ogden and that she had 
stopped at her home in Randolph before proceeding to Wyoming, where she was arrested. 
Id 
As the trial court correctly concluded, these statements, as communications 
between law enforcement officers in the course of an investigation, are presumptively 
reliable. R. 112. The Utah Supreme Court stated: "[T]here is a presumption that law 
enforcement officers will convey information to each other truthfully." State v. Nielsen, 
727 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1986). This presumption has been accepted by the United States 
Supreme Court and lower courts in virtually every jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. 
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965) ("Observations of fellow officers of the Government 
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engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for 
by one of their number"); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment, § 3.5(a) (3d ed. 2003) ("[L]ower courts have consistently held that another 
law enforcement officer is a reliable source and that consequently no special showing of 
reliability need be made as a part of the probable cause determination").; see Nielsen, 727 
P.2d at 192 ("[T]here is a presumption that law enforcement officers will convey 
information to each other truthfully"); see also Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 111; LaFave, § 
3.5(a). Accordingly, the reviewing magistrate correctly relied upon those statements in 
determining there was probable cause to search defendant's trailer home. 
B. Reliable Informant Statements Were Properly 
Included in Deputy Stacey's Affidavit 
Defendant claims the statements from Threll Orton and the Wyoming informant 
were unreliable because the affidavit did not disclose the time or context for the 
statements or disclose any background that would establish credibility. Aplt. Br. at 19. 
Defendant also claims the affidavit should have revealed that Orton was under arrest at 
the time he made the allegations. Aplt. Br. at 20. "The affidavit reveals nothing about 
Threll Orton except his name and his uncorroborated allegations of buying drugs at 
Defendant's trailer." Aplt. Br. at 19.3 These claims lack merit. 
' The trial court did not address these contentions because it found the 
presumptively reliable information from the Wyoming deputies sufficient to establish 
probable cause. R. 112. The trial court is correct. Nonetheless, the State discusses the 
reliability of Orton and the Wyoming informant because their statements were also 
properly relied upon by the magistrate and bolster the existence of probable cause. See 
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The reliability of an informant is assessed under the totality of the circumstances 
and in light of factors articulated by this Court in Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 
231, 235-36 (Utah App.1997).4 Under Mulcahy, reliable informants are those who are 
identified by name, have a clear basis for knowing the information they provide and offer 
detailed statements that are at least partially corroborated by investigating officers or 
deputies. Id. Application of these factors demonstrates that Orton and the Wyoming 
informant were properly relied upon by the magistrate in determining probable cause fur 
the search. 
Threll Orton. Under the first Mulcahy factor, an identified "citizen-informant" 
whose basis of knowledge is clearly stated is high on the reliability scale, while a 
confidential informants, '"whose basis of knowledge and veracity are typically unknown," 
is toward "the low-end of the reliability scale." Id. at 235 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Orton, although apparently not a "citizen informant" who 
"Volunteered] information out of concern for the community," id., still shows indicia of 
State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, ^  10, n.6, 12 P.3d 110 (u[W]e may affirm the trial 
court's ruling 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground . . . even [if different] from that 
stated by the trial court.'" (citing Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass 'n, 461 P.2d 290, 
293, n.2 (1969)). 
4
 This Court has stated that the three Mulcahy factors apply where "the information 
obtained from [an] informant [ ] is the primary support for the search warrant..." State 
v. DeLuna, 2001 UT App 401, \ 9 , 40 P.3d 1136 (emphasis added). Here, because the 
informants do not provide the primary support for the search warrant, strict application of 
Mulcahy is not required. Nonetheless, the Mulcahy factors are illuminating and will be 
used to articulate the basis for the reliability of the non-police sources of information. 
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reliability under the first factor because he is fully identified and his basis of knowledge 
clearly stated. See R. 18, 111; Deputy's Report. 
The second Mulcahy factor concerns whether "the informant gave enough detail 
about the observed criminal activity to support a [warrant]." State v. Deluna, 2001 UT 
App 401,H 19, 40 P.3d 1136 (alteration in original; citation omitted). Under this factor, it 
is clear that the information from Orton, although summarized in the search affidavit, 
provided details sufficient to identify defendant and pinpoint the location of the trailer 
where Orton purchased the drugs. R. 18, 111; Deputy's Report. Additionally, Orton's 
information was also "more reliable [because] it is apparent that [he] observed the details 
personally, instead of simply relaying information from a third party." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 
at 236. 
Finally, under the third Mulcahy factor—corroboration—Deputy Stacey confirmed 
the essential details of Orton's account by determining there was a woman named Laura 
who lived at the trailer Orton described. Id.; see R. 18, 111; Deputy's Report. Orton's 
statements were further corroborated by defendant's arrest for possession of 
methamphetamine—one of the drugs Orton claimed he purchased at defendant's 
trailer—as well as the report from the Wyoming informant that defendant was planning to 
sell the drugs in Wyoming. 
Despite Orton's strong showing of reliability under Mulcahy, defendant presses 
her challenge to his reliability on several points. For example, defendant points to alleged 
discrepancies between the search affidavit and the Deputy's Report. Aplt. Br. at 19. She 
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notes that although Orton states that he purchased the drugs from "a woman in Randolph 
named Laura/' the search affidavit states that he "bought methamphetamine from Laura 
Dable at the trailer described int his affidavit on at least two occasions." R. 18; Deputy's 
Report. 
However, defendant omits the fact that Deputy Stacey states in his report that he 
investigated Orton's statement and was able to locate the described trailer and determine 
that it belonged to defendant. See Deputy's Report. Thus, his representation to the 
magistrate in the search affidavit that Orton purchased the drugs from Laura Dable was 
supported by his independent investigation of Orton's statement. 
More fundamentally, defendant's focus on Orton's inability to provide the frill 
name of the person who sold the drugs misses the point. The real issue for purposes of 
determining the validity of the search warrant is not who lives at the home, but whether it 
was the place where he purchased the drugs. Because Orton's description was clearly 
adequate to locate the trailer, his inability to frilly identify who lived there is of only 
peripheral importance. 
Defendant also argues that the search affidavit should have disclosed that Orton 
was under arrest when he told Deputy Stacey he had purchased drugs at defendant's 
trailer home. "This was not a case where a disinterested citizen supplied the 
information." Aplt. Br. at 20. But this characterization of Orton's alleged bias is mere 
speculation. Although Orton's custody status raises questions concerning his motives for 
speaking to Deputy Stacey, there is nothing in the record to establish what those motives 
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might be. In the absence of any record to the contrary, this Court should not accept 
defendant's invitation to speculate about the possible ulterior motives Orton might have 
had. See State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (if "appellant fails 
to provide an adequate record on appeal, [we] must assume the regularity of the 
proceedings below"); State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah App. 1992) ("I]n the 
absence of an adequate record on appeal, we cannot address the issues raised and presume 
the correctness of the disposition made by the trial court"), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Gordon, 913 P.3d 350, 357 n.3 (Utah 1996). 
Finally, defendant attacks Orton's reliability by attempting to liken this case U.S. 
v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1006 (10th Cir. 2001), in which the court held that a search 
affidavit based almost entirely on information gleaned from a single confidential 
informant did not establish a nexus between illegal activity and defendant's residence. Id. 
at 1007-08.5 Defendant claims that there are "striking similarities" between her case and 
Danhauer because Stacey's affidavit, like that in Dauhauer, was based on 
uncorroborated, "repetitive and tenuous facts" supplied by an unreliable informant. Aplt. 
Br. at 20-21. 
Danhauer, however, is readily distinguishable. First, the identity of the informant 
in Danhauer was never revealed to the magistrate, id at 1006, while Orton was identified 
by name in Deputy Stacey's affidavit. Second, where the basis for the Danhauer 
5
 The court, nonetheless, upheld the search based on the "good faith exception." 
U.S. v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1007-08 (10th Cir. 2001) 
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informant's knowledge of the clandestine lab was never disclosed, id., Deputy Stacey 
stated in his affidavit that Orton knew of defendant's drug-dealing activities because he 
had purchased controlled substances from her at her home. Finally, there was no 
significant corroboration of the information provided by the Danhauer informant. Id. 
Here, by contrast, virtually all significant details of Orton's statements were corroborated. 
As noted above, Deputy Stacey confirmed the existence and location of the trailer home 
where Orton claimed to have purchased drugs and that a woman named Laura lived there. 
Defendant's involvement in buying and selling drugs was also corroborated, in part, by 
her own admissions. 
The Wyoming informant. As defendant points out, confidential informants are 
often viewed with some skepticism because their veracity or basis of knowledge may be 
unknown. See Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235 ( "[A]nonymous tips are toward 'the low-end of 
the reliability scale'") (citation omitted). However, in this case, the reliability of the 
information supplied by the Wyoming informant was independently bolstered by the fact 
that most of it had been corroborated at the time Deputy Stacey requested the search 
warrant. Corroboration of some of the information supplied by an informant increases the 
likelihood that the remaining information will also be true. See, e.g., State v. Weinberg, 
575 A.2d 1003, 1008 (Conn.) ("The theory of corroboration is that a statement which has 
been shown true in some respects is reasonably likely to be true in the remaining 
respects") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 967 
(1990). The information from the Wyoming informant indicated that defendant was 
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planning to purchase drugs in Ogden on June 6, 2000 and that she intended to sell the 
drugs in Wyoming. Id. On June 7, 2000, when Deputy Stacey presented the search 
affidavit to the magistrate, defendant had been arrested in Wyoming for possession of 
marijuana and methamphetamine, which she admitted she had purchased in Ogden. Id. 
Because defendant's arrest and admissions partially corroborated statements from the 
informant, the remaining uncorroborated claim—that defendant's purpose in coming 
Wyoming was to sell drugs—is also entitled to some credence. This fact is important 
because it indicates defendant was involved in the sale of marijuana and 
methamphetamine and bolsters Orton's claim that he had purchased drugs at defendant's 
trailer on at least two occasions. 
Thus, contrary to defendant's claims, the sources cited by Deputy Stacey in the 
search affidavit were reliable. Accordingly, defendant's claim that the magistrate erred in 
relying on information from those sources in finding probable cause to search the trailer is 
meritless. 
II. THE TOTALITY OF FACTS PRESENTED IN THE 
AFFIDAVIT—INCLUDING DEFENDANT'S ARREST 
FOR POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, 
HER ADMISSION THAT SHE HAD JUST PURCHASED 
DRUGS AND THAT SHE HAD STOPPED BY HER 
TRAILER AFTERWARD—ESTABLISHED PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO SEARCH THE TRAILER. 
Defendant claims that the affidavit supporting the request for a search warrant was 
defective because it "failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe that contraband or 
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evidence of a crime would be found at defendant's residence." Aplt. Br. at 14. This 
claim lacks merit. 
When reviewing the adequacy of an affidavit in support of a search warrant, 
[t]he magistrate's task is to decide whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including 
the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 
State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, \ 29, 996 P.2d 555 (quotations and citations 
omitted), cert, denied, 9 P.3d 170 (2000). When reviewing a challenge to a search 
warrant, this Court "pay[s] great deference to the magistrate's determination." State v. 
Vigk 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994). 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate correctly concluded there 
was a fair probability that evidence of illicit drug use or trafficking would be found at 
defendant's trailer. First, the magistrate knew that defendant was in custody on drug 
charges and that she had admitted purchasing the drugs in Ogden. R. 18, 11 l[a]. 
Although "probable cause to arrest does not automatically provide probable cause to 
search the arrestee's home," it does, under some circumstances, increase "the likelihood 
that that person's residence contains evidence of the crime . . ." U.S. v. Jones, 994 F.2d 
1051, 1055-56 (3rd Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). 
Second, search of defendant's trailer was supported by information suggesting that 
defendant was not just a drug user, but a drug dealer. The Wyoming informant stated that 
defendant's trip to Wyoming was for the purpose of selling drugs. R. 18. Additionally, 
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Threll Orton informed Deputy Stacey that he had purchased methamphetamine at 
defendant's trailer on at least two occasions. Id. Because there was reliable information 
that defendant was a drug dealer, the magistrate properly found probable cause to search 
her home. As one court succinctly stated: "[I]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is 
likely to be found where the dealers live.'" U.S. v. Terry, 911 F.2d 272, 275 (9th 
Cir.1990) (citation omitted). This common sense observation that drug dealers will likely 
keep controlled substances and other evidence of illegal activities at their homes has been 
recognized by a number of courts. See, e.g., United States v. Emmons, 24 F.3d 1210 
(10th Cir.1994) (affidavit sufficient where large quantities of marijuana made it 
reasonable to believe defendant was a dealer and officer stated that in his experience 
distributors keep records, packaging, and assets at home); United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 
1366 (9th Cir.1993) (nexus can be inferred on probable cause affidavit establishing 
defendant's ongoing drug dealing and that place to be searched is his residence); United 
States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.1993) (held there was probable cause to search 
defendant's home where affiant stated that in his experience "drug traffickers maintain 
records relating to drug activity at a place such as a home" and "that contraband, drug 
proceeds and other indicia of drug trafficking such as coded telephone numbers, 
photographs and firearms are secreted in safe places such as homes"). 
Third, the fact that defendant admitted she had stopped at her home after her drug 
purchase in Ogden and before her arrest also supports probable cause to search her home. 
Many courts have recognized that a defendant's arrest for selling drugs can create 
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probable cause to search the defendant's home, especially when the seller went to his 
home prior to the sale or the sale occurred near the home. See, e.g.. United States v. 
Hulett, 22 F.3d 779, 781 (8th Cir.1994) (affirming probable cause to search defendant's 
home for records of "voluminous drug trafficking" based on telephone calls to 
defendant's home concerning drug transactions); United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719 
(10th Cir.1992) (probable cause to search defendant's residence where she returned to her 
home after arranging a drug sale, presumably to retrieve the drugs); People v. Hakel, 870 
P.2d 1224, 1229 (Colo. 1994) (probable cause to search defendant's home where 
defendant traveled directly from home to motel where sale was made); see also LaFave, 
supra, § 3.7(d) and n. 143-44. 
Taken together, the facts provided by Deputy Stacey in support of his request for a 
search warrant are more than sufficient to establish probable cause to search defendant's 
trailer. The totality of the circumstances—defendant's arrest for possession of controlled 
substances, her admission that she purchased the drugs in Ogden and that she had stopped 
at her trailer before her arrest in Wyoming, and information from two informants 
suggesting defendant was a drug dealer and had sold drugs from the trailer on at least two 
occasions—creates the strong and entirely reasonable inference that illegal substances or 
other relevant evidence would be discovered at her residence. Accordingly, defendant's 
attack on the magistrate's probable cause determination is without merit. 
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III. WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANT IMPROPERLY 
AUTHORIZED A NIGHTTIME, "NO-KNOCK" SEARCH 
IS INCONSEQUENTIAL GIVEN THAT THE SEARCH 
WAS ACTUALLY CONDUCTED DURING THE 
DAYTIME WHILE DEFENDANT WAS NOT HOME. 
Defendant claims some sections of the search warrant were improperly left blank 
and that these "omissions" violated Utah law because they improperly authorized a 
nighttime, "no-knock" search. Aplt. Br. at 24-25. This argument is frivolous because the 
search was conducted during the day while defendant was not at home. 
The search warrant was prepared by using a standard form, portions of which may 
be filled in by the requesting officer and the magistrate. R. 11. One section of the form 
gives the magistrate the option of authorizing execution of the warrant either during the 
"daytime" or "anytime, day or night." Id. Another section allows the magistrate to 
indicate whether the officers "(are) [or[ (are not)" authorized to execute a no-knock 
search. These sections were not filled in and defendant apparently believes that the 
magistrate's failure to circle or choose among the listed alternatives means the warrant 
authorized the execution of the warrant without notice and at any time, day or night. 
Aplt. Br. at 24-25. 
These claims are without merit. First, the claim that the warrant somehow 
improperly authorized a nighttime search is moot because the warrant was not served at 
night. A defendant suffers no prejudice when an improper nighttime search warrant is 
served during the day. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Trujillo, 854 P.2d 603, 609 (Utah App. 
1993) (a defendant suffers no prejudice when search warrant improperly authorizing 
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nighttime search is executed during the day). Defendant admits that the search warrant 
was served during the daylight hours at 6:32 p.m. June 7, 2000. R. 125:12.6 Thus, even if 
the warrant improperly authorized a nighttime search, defendant suffered no prejudice.7 
Defendant's claim that the search warrant improperly authorized a "no-knock" 
search fails for similar reasons. Ordinarily, an officer serving a search warrant may not 
forcibly enter a residence unless, after giving notice of his authority to search, he 
determines no one is home, in which case he may ccuse such force as is reasonably 
necessary to enter;.. ." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-210(2). Here, defendant was in jail in 
Wyoming and so was not at home when the search was conducted. Thus, defendant, not 
surprisingly, has no idea whether the officers knocked before entering; nor has she 
introduced any evidence to suggest they did not. Absent some evidence to the contrary, 
this Court should assume the search warrant was served properly and that the officers 
6
 "Daytime" is currently defined as the hours between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-23-201(1) (Supp. 2002). Prior to adoption of that statutory definition, 
the term "night" had been judicially defined as one-half hour after sunset until one-half 
hour before sunrise. State v. Simmons, 844 P.2d 614 (Utah App. 1993). Under either 
definition, the search warrant was clearly served during the daytime. 
7
 Defendant also seems to suggest that the search was improper even though it 
began in the daytime because it did not conclude until 10:16 p.m., which defendant 
contends was "night." Aplt. Br. at 25. This argument fails because Utah law imposes 
time limits only for serving a warrant, not for the duration of the search. See, e.g., Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-23-205(1) ("The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that it 
be served in the daytime . . . " ) (emphasis added). This interpretation of the time limits in 
the Utah statute is consistent with the interpretation of similar requirements in other 
states. See, e.g., Shope v. State, 396 A.2d 282, 288 (Maryland App. 1979) (search 
executed pursuant to a "daytime" search warrant not improper because search concluded 
after dark). 
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gave proper notice before entering defendant's trailer. See, e.g., Miller, 718 P.2d at 405 
(if "appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, [we] must assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below"). But even assuming the officers conducted an 
improper no-knock search, the error is harmless where the home is unoccupied. State v. 
Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988); see also, Trujillo, 854 P.2d at 702 (*"[I]t is of no 
consequence that the police failed to announce their authority and purpose prior to entry if 
no one was present therein at the time'") (citing 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A 
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 4.8(b), at 277). 
IV. ALTHOUGH UNNECESSARY IN THIS CASE, THE 
"GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION59 TO THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT WOULD VALIDATE THE SEARCH 
BECAUSE OFFICERS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH. 
Finally, defendant argues that this Court should not apply the so-called "good faith 
exception" to the warrant requirement to validate the search in the event that the warrant 
is deemed defective. Aplt. Br. at 25-28. In the State's view, this Court need not reach 
this issue because the search warrant was supported by probable cause and so the good 
faith exception is unnecessary. Nonetheless, in the interest of thoroughness, the State will 
briefly address defendant's claim. 
Under the good faith exception, evidence seized pursuant to a defective search 
warrant need not be suppressed if the executing officer acted with an objective, good faith 
belief that the warrant was properly issued by a neutral magistrate. See United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-24 (1984). "There is a presumption that when an officer relies 
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upon a warrant, the officer is acting in good faith It is only when the officer's reliance 
on the warrant is 'wholly unwarranted' that good faith is absent." State v. Horton, 848 
P.2d 708, 711 (Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted). 
The Supreme Court recognizes four situations in which an officer would not have 
reasonable grounds for believing a warrant was properly issued: (1) the issuing 
magistrate is misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or 
would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) the issuing 
magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role and fails to perform his neutral and detached 
function; (3) the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; (4) the warrant is so 
facially deficient that it failed to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be 
seized. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23. In these situations, the good-faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule does not apply. 
None of the Leon scenarios apply in this case. Defendant has presented no 
evidence to suggest that the magistrate was misled or that Deputy Stacey intentionally or 
recklessly omitted important facts. See Horton, 848 P. 2d at 711 ("The mere omission of 
information that could have been included in an affidavit does not necessarily amount to 
an intent to mislead"). Nor is there any suggestion that the magistrate was not neutral and 
detached in reviewing Stacey's affidavit. The affidavit contained numerous details from 
several sources, including law enforcement officials, and clearly described defendant's 
trailer and the items to be seized. The affidavit and search warrant also particularized the 
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place to be searched and the items to be seized. Accordingly, the affidavit and search 
warrant was not a "bare bones" affidavit, "devoid of facts." See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926. 
As such, the affidavit, even assuming it did not establish probable cause, was nonetheless 
executed in good faith. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \cf^\ day of May, 2003 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
77-23-205. Time for service — Officer may request assis-
tance. 
(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that it be serve^ 
in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable ca ^ 
to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior i 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason, ^ 
which case he may insert a direction that it be served any time of t h ^ a % h e 
night. An officer may request other persons to assist him in conducting 
search. , i^te of 
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from the a y , 
issuance. Any search warrant not executed within this time shall be voia 
shall be returned to the court or magistrate as not executed. 
77-23-210. Force used in executing warrant — When no-
tice of authority is required as a prerequisite. 
When a search warrant has been issued authorizing entry into any building, 
room, conveyance, compartment, or other enclosure, the officer executing the 
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter: 
(1) if, after notice of his authority and purpose, there is no response or 
he is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate 
issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give 
notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that the 
object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or 
that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
A. W. Lauritzen 
Attorney at Law/ Attorney for Defendant 
P. O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (435) 753-3391 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF RICH, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAURA DABLE 
Defendant, 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Case No. 00110027 FS 
Judge Judkins 
This matter came on for hearing before the Court on 25 June, 2001 at the hour of 10:00 
A.M. and the Court having been fully briefed on the claims of the parties and having attended to 
argument of counsel having found the pertinent and relevant facts of the case as follows: 
FACTS AS PRESENTED BY THE CASE 
1. In April of 2000 Officer Dale Stacey spoke with a man named Threll Orton after he had 
been arrested by Wyoming authorities and while he was incarcerated in Evanston, Wyoming; the 
arrest was based on a charge of allegedly selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. Mr. 
Orton informed Officer Stacey that he had gotten the Methamphetamine, which provided the basis 
for the Wyoming charge, from a woman in Randolph named Laura and a description of her 
residence was provided. 
2. On June 6, 2000, Officer Stacey allegedly was contacted by Deputy Kim Clark from 
the Lincoln County, Wyoming Sheriffs Office. Officer Clark requested that officers in Randolph, 
Utah watch out for a woman named Laura Dable who had a trailer on West Park Street. Officer 
Clark allegedly told Officer Stacey that an informant had told them Defendant was going to 
Ogden to pick up some Marijuana and Methamphetamine to sell in Lincoln County and that he 
felt that they had enough information to make a traffic stop and search the vehicle. Officer Stacey 
stated in a June 14, 2000 report, "We did not see Dable in Randolph that evening.", referring to 
June 6,200a1 
3. On June 7, 2000, Officer Stacey allegedly received a telephone call from Officer Clark 
stating that Wyoming authorities had arrested Defendant, and that she had in her possession 
approximately 4 ounces of Marijuana and 8 grams of Methamphetamine. It was reported to 
Officer Stacey that Defendant admitted to Officer Kim Clark and Officer Jodie Gardner that she-
had bought the drugs in Ogden, and then stopped at her trailer in Randolph before proceeding to 
Wyoming where she was arrested. 
4. Officer Stacey, relying on the above information, prepared an Affidavit^ copy of which 
is on file with the Court. Officer Stacey, without assistance from the Rich County Attorney 
presented the Affidavit and a proposed Search Warrant, which warrant is attached 
hereto as Exhibit B. to Judge Ross McKinnon to "look over",at around 6:00 p.m. on June 7, 
2000. 
1
 All of the above data came from the notes of Officer Stacey, provided to Defendant by the Rich County Attorney's 
office pursuant to a Discovery request served by Defendant. 
5. Judge MdKinnon, accepted the Affidavit as prepared by Officer Dale Stacey without 
noting changes, deletions or additions and based thereon issued a Search Warrant for the trailer of 
Laura Dable at West Park Street in Randolph, Utah, authorizing a search for controlled 
substances, packaging material, or any type of paraphernalia used with illegal controlled 
substances. The search was conducted and was concluded at 22:35 hrs., sunset on June 7th, 2000 
was at 20:59 hours. 
The Court now concludes as a matter of law that: 
6. The Statement and information in the Affidavit attributed to Law Enforcement Officers 
even if said officer or officers were not known to the Affiant need no other verification or other 
indicia of reliability and may be, taken as true by the magistrate simply because the informant 
was a Peace Officer. 
7. The information provided in the Affidavit, without any weight given to it except as 
provided by the Wyoming officers was sufficient, to justify issuance of a Search Warrant given 
the supporting circumstances of this case. 
8. The fact that Defendant was not mirandized prior to her purported statement to 
Wyoming Peace Officers does not require that the Magistrate refuse to consider said statements 
as providing part of the basis for issuance of a warrant or that the Court give less weight to said 
unmirandized statement. 
9. Since the information provided in the Affidavit exclusive of that attributed to Threll 
Orton is sufficient to justify the issuance of a Search Warrant; the omission of certain facts 
surrounding his statement is not material to the evaluation of the Affidavit. 
10. Since the search commenced during daylight hours, the unsupported direction that 
the Search Warrant could be executed day or night is harmless error. 
11. The fact that the Search Warrant was a form in blank and was incompletely filled 
out is harmless error. 
12. The fact that the Affidavit contained unsupportable allegations, since those facts need 
not necessarily be found in order to support issuance of the Search Warrant, that inaccuracy 
does not bear on the adequacy of the Affidavit. 
Based on the foregoing findings, the Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized pursuant to the 
Search Warrant issued in this case is denied. 
Dated this %_ day of AA V I [ 2002 
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
RICH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs • 
LAURA DABLE, 
Defendant, 
Case No. 001100027 
Transcript of Audio Tape, 
Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing 
Honorable Clint S. Judkins presiding. 
First District Court Courthouse 
Randolph, Utah 
June 26, 2001 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: JOE A. GREENLIEF 
County Attorney 
For the Defendant: A. W. LAURITZEN 
Attorney at Law 
RODNEY M. FELSHAW 
Registered Professional Reporter 
First District Court 
P. 0. Box 873 
Brigham City, UT 84302-0873 
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1 THE COURT: Take the case of State of Utah versus 
2 Laura Dable. This is the time set for argument on 
3 plaintiff's motion to -- excuse me. Defendant's motion to 
4 suppress. Mr. Lauritzen. 
5 MR. LAURITZEN: Yes, Your Honor. I have submitted 
6 briefs in this matter. I think that this is a case that 
7 probably stands out of my repertoire of practice before the 
8 many courts in this land as an area where people simply just 
9 don't take the Fourth Amendment seriously. I sometimes 
10 wonder if the justice of the peace system, in their 
11 instructions, don't tell the judges to go ahead and deal with 
12 these things and expect that a higher court will take care of 
13 it. 
14 This is kind of shocking case in a way because there is 
15 simply no basis on which one could credit the information 
16 that was supplied to the justice with any aura of 
17 credibility. Certainly the officer had some information two 
18 months before from an individual who he didn't know from a 
19 bale of hay, so to speak. He didn't do anything to 
20 investigate that information, to verify anything that was 
21 given to him there. In fact, he didn't really open an 
22 investigation as far as is shown on the affidavits. 
23 Thereafter, two months later, he was apprised of 
24 something that involved my client and on that basis he dug 
25 out this old information and provided it to the justice, 
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1 still not knowing anything about the credibility of the 
2 individual who supplied the evidence or having given any 
3 subsequent investigation to see if there was any basis for it 
4 from his own knowledge. The justice apparently looked at the 
5 matter rather uncritically and signed the warrant. I just 
6 can't se$ how, under the circumstances, that this is an area 
7 which we can allow to go on. 
8 Then, the warrant itself is a blank. Some of the areas 
9 J were filled in and some of the areas were not. It seems to 
10 me that that's a serious default in itself because it leaves 
11 areas open for someone to modify. It isn't like the peace 
12 officer who comes in and raises his right hand is necessarily 
13 the one who serves the warrant. The want is to any peace 
14 officer. Who knows whose hands those might pass through? So 
15 the warrant itself seems to me to be very suspect. 
16 I suggest that under the circumstances there was 
17 certainly no need for a hurry. In fact, the defendant was 
18 under arrest in another jurisdiction. The telephones were 
19 available for a warrant. There was plenty of time to 
20 transcribe all of these matters into the original without use 
21 of a printed formed so that the directions were clear and not 
22 subject to abridgement or change. 
23 Again, I'm not going to belabor it, but I've gone into 
24 several areas. One of the things that I'm concerned about is 
25 when the justice looked at the warrant he should have 
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1 probably noted that the individual had not been Mirandised. 
2 That may very well have caused him to question it if that had 
3 been -- if that information had been given him, that there 
4 was -- had been no Miranda. 
5 But more seriously, probably more seriously than any of 
6 the things we see here in this particular warrant, is the 
7 fact that there were some omissions of some very serious 
8 matters which could very well have colored the thinking of 
9 the magistrate. If he had known that the information that 
10 was supplied to the officers, and which was narrated to him 
11 in the affidavit, was taken from a person who was being held 
12 under arrest un-Mirandised and who had a good deal to gain, 
13 possibly, by providing information in exchange for his 
14 freedom. None of this was noted on the affidavit. 
15 It isn't like someone came up, a citizen came up and 
16 volunteered and said I have some information as a concerned 
17 citizen. Ifm completely — and in this particular case I 
18 have no axe to grind. When we have a person who is under 
19 duress, who is under arrest, I think that should certainly be 
20 noted. I think that was a serious omission. 
21 All in all, I suggest that the warrant was of such a 
22 nature and was issued based on an affidavit with some 
23 deficiencies to the point that in fact the search itself was 
24 invalid and was not justified by the strictures of the Fourth 
25 Amendment and any evidence seized thereby should be 
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1 suppressed. 
2 THE COURT: Mr. Greenlief. 
3 MR. GREENLIEF: I have not had the privilege of 
4 reading Mr. Lauritzen's memo in response to plaintiff's 
5 opposition of the defendant's motion to suppress. It says 
6 that it was sent on the 16th day of May. I have no reason to 
7 believe it was not. I just — it's not in my file. I talked 
81 to my secretary and she didn't know about it, hadn't heard of 
9 it either, but I stand as the one at fault because it's my 
10 office and I don't think it's the secretary's fault. I just 
11 didn't get it in any event. 
12 However, the main thing which Mr. Lauritzen speaks of 
13 this morning, and also in his briefs and so forth, is that 
14 the trouble with the information garnered from the defendant 
15 in the Lincoln County prison -- or Lincoln County jail. 
16 Maybe it was Uintah County. No, I believe it was — okay, it 
17 was Uintah County. It was down south of us here. 
18 But the key to the entire thing is that the primary thing 
19 that the officers were relying on is that there was 
20 information from two very good — well, two other officers in 
21 Uintah County, Evanston, that the defendant had been stopped 
22 and was at that time in jail in Uintah County in Evanston for 
23 drug matters. That's the way I understand the case and 
24 that's the key to it. These two officers knew what they had 
25 found and that's pretty well set forth in the briefs and so 
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forth. 
So the information of Therell was not necessary. It was 
supportive, 
is all 
it happ 
actual 
It1 
Miranda 
that 
ened 
as was stated in 
it actually was. 
first by a couple 
thing. 
s my 
our original response. And that 
It was put first simply because 
> of months, but that was not the 
understanding that Mr. Orton was given his 
again by — well, no. He was not because he was not 
given it because he wasnft charged. They were just talking 
to him about this particular 
any thought 
wasn't 
but it 
I b 
counsel 
by the Rich Count 
necessary to give him 
wasn 
lady. He wasn't the focus of 
.y officers, so at that time it 
the Miranda. He was in jail, 
t because of anything Rich County had done. 
elieve on those bases 
THE COURT: Rebuttal 
MR. LAURITZEN: I'll 
we'll submit it. 
9 
. submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, one problem that youfve got, 
, both of you is that 
of facts in 
certain 
petitio 
this case. Now, 
facts in your origina 
n to 
only assume 
The 
April o 
Orton a 
suppress. Since 
that those facts 
facts that the court 
f 2000, Officer Stacey 
fter 
nobody has given me a firm set 
Mr. Lauritzen, you've alleged 
il memorandum in support of the 
nobody objected to that I can 
are true and accurate. 
finds in this case are that in 
r
 spoke with a man named Therell 
he'd been arrested by Wyoming authorities and 
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1 while incarcerated in Evanston, Wyoming. And that Officer 
2 Stacey got in — Mr. Orton informed Officer Stacey that he'd 
3 gotten the methamphetamine, which provided the basis for the 
4 Wyoming charge, from a woman in Randolph named Laura and a 
5 description of the residence was provided. 
6 Now, you've not disputed that, Mr. Greenlief. Is that 
7 then correct? 
8 MR. GREENLIEF: We've not disputed that he said 
9 Laura. 
10 THE COURT: But he didn't say Laura Dable? 
11 MR. GREENLIEF: No, but there are no other Lauras in 
12 Randolph, to my knowledge. 
13 THE COURT: Well, how do we know that? Did the 
14 affidavit state that? So the court finds that as a fact, 
15 that --
16 MR. GREENLIEF: I believe, Your Honor, if I may. 
17 THE COURT: Try me out. 
18 MR. GREENLIEF: I believe he did give a description 
19 of the trailer and of the outside of it and so forth. An 
20 eight on the front, the color, where it was on the south 
21 end — excuse me, the north end of the trailer court on Park 
22 Street. 
23 THE COURT: I don't think there's any question, even 
24 though that Mr. Lauritzen didn't put that in his statement of 
25 facts, and which you didn't address in your memorandum, that 
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1 the trailer was described with specificity, but I think --
2 let's look at the affidavit that was submitted in support of 
3 the request for the search warrant. 
4 I (Pause in the proceedings.) 
51 THE COURT: Yes. It says Therell Orton told your 
6 affiant that he was able to buy methamphetamine from Laura 
7 Dable. Already, however, itfs agreed that that was Laura, 
8 1 not Laura Dable, the person living in the described trailer. 
9 There is a description of the trailer. Dable was arrested in 
101 Lincoln County, Wyoming on 6/7/00 for possession of 
11 methamphetamine and some marijuana. Mr. Lauritzen, there's 
12 no dispute as to that? 
13 MR. LAURITZEN: No. 
14 THE COURT: All right. The court further finds that 
15 this Therell Orton did not say Laura Dable, he said, Laura, 
16 but then went on with specificity and described a trailer, 
17 which is the trailer which is the subject of the search. 
18 That occurred in April of 2000. Then, on June 6th, 2000, 
19 Officer Stacey was contacted by Deputy Kim Clark from Lincoln 
20 County, Wyoming and Officer Clark told Officer Stacey that an 
21 informant had told them the defendant was going to Ogden to 
22 pick up some methamphetamine and marijuana to sell in Lincoln 
23 County and apparently he was going to stop and search the 
24 vehicle. Mr. Lauritzen, you'll agree that those are facts? 
25 MR. LAURITZEN: They were in the affidavit. 
Page 9 
1 MR. GREENLIEF: Also, I believe Jody Gardner was the 
2 additional officer from Uintah County in Wyoming. In Lincoln 
3 County, rather. 
4 THE COURT: Kim Clark and an Officer Jody Gardner, 
5 both officers in Lincoln County, Wyoming. Then your next 
6 facts, Mr. Lauritzen, indicate, and the court will so find, 
7 that there was a telephone conversation between Officer 
8 Stacey and Officer Kim Clark and Officer Jody Gardner from 
9 Wyoming, wherein they indicated that they had a confidential 
10 informant who had indicated that the defendant was going to 
11 pick up methamphetamine in Ogden. All right. 
12 Then we'll go to number four of the facts set forth by 
13 Mr. Lauritzen. Officer Stacey relied upon the above 
14 information prepared in the affidavit, a copy of which is 
15 attached hereto as exhibit A. Officer Stacey, without 
16 assistance of Rich County, presented the affidavit with the 
17 proposed search warrant. 
18 Wait a minute. Let's go back to number three of Mr. 
19 Lauritzen's alleged facts. It says it was reported to 
20 Officer Stacey that the defendant admitted to Officer Kim 
21 Clark and Officer Jody Gardner that she had bought the drugs 
22 in Ogden and had stopped at her trailer in Randolph before 
23 proceeding to Wyoming where she was arrested. 
24 Mr. Lauritzen, what I would like you to do, I'm going to 
25 direct your attention to a couple of things here and ask you 
Page 10 
LO give r^ . .* position nen. 
THE COURT at :s, do y~u f^ . . ',.-
made by your . Lne Lincoln County ofticerr 
did not constitute sufficient probable caus° t: . 
issuance of a s* - ^ ±i so w,AJ ^ i.. 
"AURITZEN: Because, "Vurb^ r ^r». shp r. 
that 3hp r);cr.c dt the trailer. 
THE COURT: But she did admit she was there1/ 
10 MR. LAUK ""red there. ihe second 
] son io becau^ fi-t v.e hac *c J ^ ^ officers t 
12 I haa picked up *.. "'"."/ JLL xoiJ. !_*.•-
u Liiem she hao' nicked them up at her irailer, She could 
14 
18 
20 
22 
24 
have stopped, there lui .n, i* i i,( i "i1" she was nonspecific in 
" I ,-if 
And third, th_ . . . . - - not automatically 
x LU credit for reliability, - ificers, assuming 
they were officers, a.- to believe cney /.-re 
otherwise, still :^ \re a.,t to b*- ;,v- --omo aun n f 
credibi ! i **" THPV - , ^ u u b)inevr in- »: c 
' " ke it at face v,i .• : ere ha< to i-*- somethino < 
up. Probably i-> . ~*y iiav'e *.. Lne 
1
 aedit witn ^nese fallow • ^ey 3r~e 
silent -1 n +-ka+- area and 
it tuuiu iia1^ Hopn areen officers t ac-d with their fiist 
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1 arrest; faced with not enough evidence themselves to make an 
2 arrest and wanting to get some more evidence. They may have 
3 had some reasons for their own to go ahead and try to supply 
4 facts which would allow them to ultimately gain additional 
5 evidence. I don't know that. 
6 The other reason, of course, is that Ms. Dable herself 
7 was under arrest at that time. There's no evidence before 
8 this court at this time that she had been Mirandised. 
9 J THE COURT: Do you think that there's some case law 
10 that says she has to be? 
11 MR. LAURITZEN: I can't find any, but I suggest that 
12 that's certainly a factor that the justice should take into 
13 consideration, whether or not the person had been warned, 
14 number one, of their right to remain silent which would give 
15 them ease in dealing with the police. I think that's the 
16 whole reason for the Miranda is to give them ease and not 
17 feel threatened, realizing that they have certain rights. 
18 And with that in mind they might be more likely, number one, 
19 to speak truthfully or, number two, not to speak at all. 
20 Anyway, those are the reasons I give the court. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. I'll direct your attention to 
22 another deficiency in the search warrant and hear your 
23 position on that. That is the, and this causes some concern 
24 to the court, the search warrant says you are therefore 
25 commanded to make immediate search in the day time, any time 
Page 12 
day or night, of the person of the vehicles d e s c i m p d H' , t\ 
then it goes on l ' -v ,,,V! 'M^ 'II RV trailer, single axle, ai 
describes the premises. 
Where it saj . ^ ^ M y or ::ij-*, .. 
iver marked, crossed oft. • ! celeid- Qect. 
he magistrate :.. -ectiun xh tne warrant * n-
±a to ue serve i , 'he day turn:, unless ^he a . 
-. | ral testimony . ' cause to relieve t: v 
J-
Lcn xo ixecessarv . , ' : r.ignr to — — - th« proper:. 
101 :<" being conce-,.*., - * • - altered or for 
] jvu reason, m wh ; -h :ase he may insert a cL :-
]. J * nat ,\ ~~ served anv y ui iixgnt. A . \t 
•'•rer n n y request otrv,: persons to assis** ; n ^or. ^ u.;* 
14 I search. 
nis search, a~ * ',-:derstand it, i.i ^ M n „!:>_ i • .- J 
H alleged by Mr. ^ r e e . i ^ *m .ui opposition 
I '•'"Teto, indicates that this search tea in ^ 6:32 r ^ 
L.j ar 6:32 p.m. on .Tnnp " LO U H ^ ^ ^ _ime 
,.' - ' MR, LAURITZEN: •' time. I'll 
. iree witn uv— . 
22 | THE COURT , t\ M > i • 11«i A«> y » h i nQ else, Mr . 
lUiitzen, .youV ' i ^ to bring to my attention? 
THE COURT i going to deny the motion to suppress 
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and in so doing indicate the following. Ifve made certain 
findings 
provided 
was such 
reliable 
they just 
here. I'm going to find that the information 
by the peace officers out of Lincoln County, Wyoming 
that it did not require any more verification of a 
witness other than being peace officers, because 
. relaid information that she'd picked up drugs in 
Ogden and told them that she'd stopped in — at her residence 
or this trailer as described in Randolph, and then down to 
Wyoming. 
If th Le information had of required some sort of 
subjective reasoning on behalf of the witness, that is the 
person providing the information, then I think the police 
officers 
that the 
facts of 
officers, 
there is 
should have gone into it further. But the mere fact 
police officers were conveying a confession and the 
that confession, and the fact that they were police 
and I don't have the case directly at hand, but 
a case which indicates that under certain 
circumstances the mere fact that it is a police officer 
relaying the information, that police officer can be assumed 
to be a reliable witness unless there's some reason why it 
should not be. In this case he is just relaying that. I 
find that's the reason why additional information was not 
required of those witnesses. 
I find that the time frame, from the time that this Orton 
provided the information being nearly two months, in this 
particular case it 
warrant. K -
determinati ,t-
. '•' i nf ormati ^ 
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i-ook place a 
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e a • 
71 luformau^'' w-i.s ^.ovidecl a couple of ^ont. 
8 ! hasis for rse ui luc :**wL-r\, :> ;metime 
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nother , p r o v i d e d • M a c e ror t h i s ty^e of a n 
One L i i i n g 1 >> 
121 aff idav1*- does nr 
l L i l c i p c i r i p p r p 
oncerns * . ... 
'3-:isiratc * 
-it bothers me, that i " h ." ' i. 
a udbit with the name Liui i 
*~hey oar. bo assumed, bu" iin 
jruvidc t\-v information f 
:c that . She: i f f, v~". d r i f i 
16 J magisti.ate, mag; ..;:.' ' mia. I know Laura Dak.1*1' 
^c-r-ihpn •• residence .ii ~} x know Laura bdbb- ii *• 
ai mat LC:^ j-do... .a Liiio and the Cwiirt 
19? ^ knowledge thai -vertheless, taking the totaJ M • 
circumstances, I MIL. Lne -»ot-ion tc ^uppr^ss 
There's another thing that snould be ; 
22 
24 
'25 
bat i r- t*ha+- t-hp r 
; M r t ii at tn^~ tirr^ 
ut, but for the purp. • 
'ltzen, x i, 
.ie -- ii'n the facts 
: -'hetner 
3 aecrsior 
defendant was • vt Mir ana. 
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the Lincoln County sheriff's oJ 
information. At least there!s 
indicates that. Mr. Lauritzen 
been able to find any case law 
ffice when she provided that 
nothing in the document which 
has indicated that he's not 
which would require that she 
be Mirandised. That may be something that the appellate 
court should look at to give a basis for that, for them to 
take a look at it. The court will find, though, for today's 
purpose I cannot find that she was Mirandised, but I find 
that that doesn't make a difference for the purpose of this 
search warrant. 
Now, also, the order should include that even though the 
search warrant itself does not 
that the search warrant itself 
indicate -- it troubles me 
does not indicate that it was 
to be served day time, night time or at any time. Because it 
was served during the day time, the court does find that that 
is not a basis to strike. If it was served in the evening, 
then the court -- the decision of the court here today may be 
something different. But where it was not served in the 
evening, I find that that made 
search warrant. 
no difference whatever to the 
Now, who would like to prepare the order? 
MR. LAURITZEN: I will. 
THE COURT: Mr. Lauritzen --
MR. GREENLIEF: I was 
work on it together. 
going to suggest we kind of 
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LAURITZEN: Ina' l5 ; 
uaii a^ whatever. W .at - * ve d -r.e .! 
••-^e certain linai ,; "?~-r example, *"he no 
j -w I •«•:~.- • u u v e J. -u -u *«w j ..-*.*'- " '. p u * *.. f 1 -; 
m g e t h e i : \ b ^ • . ->-•*:.• ~ *"ake ..lUi^  un on applet 
61 _
 v o . x, information icr a.. appei]at* :ou:* 
7 flu, mil dia Liiai uixu appellate court 11 
'\\
 f but i.hey are alter rne. I have to make certain 
5 
10 
11 
12 
1 3 
1 A 
15 
1 r 
de^ibic... lor review. But at this 
point the court uili den^ rne motion to suppress. 
Wjti« n u t , 'i ' ' |n">s matter for trial? 
MR. LAURITZEN; lease, 
-1 ct y i u r y t r i a 1 ? 
MR. LAURITZEN , « 1 h ink t h a 1; s h o u 1 d b e s u .111 c 1 e n t : 
THE nMll'i I ,' II-. ••xpMdite it, Mr. Lauritzen. 
MR. LAURITZEN: No 
(Paus^ -r 4:- proceedings ) 
nave about Septembe. 
w uues tne Itr* ~i 
22 
23 THE COURT: Ms. Dable, yo ; iia/e the right to a 
nA
* speedy d i s p o s a l s . *s been pending for 
^ 1 some tui\o w^,,' ,-;e' ve lust set nere i -. 1" wi 1] p<?r.H until 
1 October. Are you willing to waive your right for a speedy 
2 disposition until that time? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes 
4 THE COURT: Very well. All right. Anything else 
51 address as relates to Ms. Dable? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Not that I can think of. 
7 1 THE COURT: Any other matters that need to come to 
8 the court's attention today? 
9 MR. LAURITZEN: None that I know of. 
10 MR. GREENLIEF: No. 
11 THE COURT: Hearing none, we'll be in recess, 
12 J (Hearing concluded.) 
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C E R T I F f C A T F" 
THIS -L. ' ~ CERTIFY that the audio taped hearmy wd 
' '"anscribta *
 : - Fplshaw, -i Certified Court 
-oiLfei aiu: '"^rtified ''.vm t Tape Tiaiiscriber in and i'u 
•. Cta*"-~ ~: : * -[ham ^itj, Utah, 
Inat d iuii/ * •',.^; and *orrect transcription _,: the 
hearing to the KIJ^. i - ' '•' set forth in the 
ambered i L~ I . iusive. 
I further cer rial transcript was 
iin Lue Cuui1 ^i'ji'^ First District Court, Rich 
County, Randolph, t. ,in. 
I also certify that I am nc* associated wit.i any 
of the parties to said matter rin ;i not interested 
tfiereof. 
Witness my hand •_:.;. * - . : 2 0 02. 
C,U..-rl K^.< j>) T;j>U>£ 0 .,J 
Rodney M. Fe 1 shaw, C . S . R. , R , P . R 
Addendum D 
DISTRICT fOIP 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant(s) 
AFFIDAVIT FOF SEARCH 
i£i 
AFI'" IRA* " II" 
RICH COUNTY ) 
) 
STATE OF I ITAI I ) i ss 
Af f i a n t , b e i n g f i rs t: di 11 y swo:i : i i, s t: a t:es • : i 1 : E 11: 1 t: 1 ia t: 
" OFFICER, I am a p e a c e o f f i c e r i n t h e S t a t e of Utah 
employed f o r 7!/l y e a r s by tfick <£. ^  S W :H\ Offkt, 
2 PROPERTY Tl I =i p r o p e r t y o r e v i d e n c e f o r whi cli . s^a rch 
wai r r a n t i s sought: i s d e s c r i b e d a s f o l l o w s : Tll^jcul (cnfoll<J ja 6^.0-1^ ftylhem ; I\a or p«ct«|*™* to 16( Tfrfal\ i 1J rj {Zr V/^p / C\ ; < 1 f&/'*fc/ ^u& '* <*j J' 
;OCATION 1 have p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o b e l i e v e t h i s , p r o p e r t y 
o r e v i d e n c e i s l o c a t e d on t h e p e r s o n / v e h i c l e v p r e m i s e 
(check t h o s e t h a t a p p l y ) d e s c r i b e d a s : ( t h e d e s c r i p t i o n must be so 
s p e c i f i c t h a t t h e l o c a t i o n c o u l d be found by one no t knowing where 
3 t i s ) ,/f yj/i/te yW(trr iA,;iK Bkt HiWi fac*1 td | W Biii of <?$ ^ 4 /-
fait S| ; « • ( i t '* tftindblpk % ii
 A ukSf Yd i ? Ae (&» f «::?f lit in** kr 
f, f, , : 1 p c : i i a^ H C t '< • ^  &st* > ^ . Tfc -frc Ctef /IfM^W 
fa* ** t m q(u* hive I *"^
x
 *> ~^^r 
Jo,J II ««<"J "1 • 8 
u 
., fki ftf"" 
Affidavit for Search Warrant, page 2 
4. STATUTORY GROUNDS. I have probable cause to believe this 
property or evidence (check those that apply and fill in blank with 
name of crime). 
Y was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed 
V has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being 
used to commit or conceal the commission of the offense of &/ltnj ;//&/( 
5. ATTACHMENTS. The following attachments are incorporated in 
this affidavit as though set forth herein: (list written 
informants1 statements, documentary evidence and other exhibits) 
Exhibit 1 -
Exhibit 2 -
Exhibit 3 -
Exhibit 4 -
Exhibit 5 -
6. NIGHT SEARCH. I have reasonable cause to believe a search is 
necessary in the night as follows: (state why property may be 
concealed, damaged, altered or other good reason). 
7. NO KNOCK. I have the following evidence which allows the 
search to be conducted without notice of authority and purpose: 
(state why the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of or secreted or why physical harm my result to a person 
if notice is given). 
AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 3 
8. ANONYMOu:? L^ « • »- .iic resignations of 
anonymous informants: 
rheii l^ieiii-LL-jr xs watnneiu jecause i state why the informant would 
be endangered or. his usefulness destroyed if; name was—stated) 
AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 4 
9. RELIABILITY. I believe the informants named herein to be 
reliable for these reasons: (check those that apply) 
L .the following informants made statements against 
their penal interest: J^ml %i 0r"fo/\ 
_the following informants are citizen informers who have no 
interest in this matter: (also state which ones are known to you 
personally) 
/ the following informants are peace officers with the 
departments noted: £,*i<CfVi £ccu*h sAeriftj tou^ * tfi»\ C/caL < W ^\U C<*jv\*C 
£ .the following informants are reliable because (state the 
name of each informant anji facts corroborating his statement or, 
previous reliable statements) jft«it Ork»-\ kid vur <v(f,wf YAcf- A< *wi ablf^ 
AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 5 
10. PROBABLE CAUSE. The following facts establish that probable 
cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant: (state the 
specific facts of the case, state how they were observed, state the 
date they were observed and the date they were reported to affiant) 
(aw> /.ttwytx CaioU ai -Me -frailer McribfJ '* ^ afcctw't o*\
 aj- \<eaj+ JUJO 
0CCa$<V»J. 
<% t-7~OQ x Sfcte t-.'fU fopdi'v K.m C\a<t a^j XL M*tr &^ 
ih-i LVKXU £u^k <T/*/iff j dff/cf. Tfleu (*4lc«id / ^ f ~tty &&z v^y
 Ut\ 
& (A^ (*& 4«J f/iaf & fonfcbMtal Ufawant fcf(</ ffo-fty, iU*{ tau«.\. VuUt "MS 
0/AMH.W c.y pkh'wi 1*6 San* jlruaf /h OqJfV °^ < ^ ~ 0 0 ^ bn'y-y fies" ,'wh 
L,VICJM (<^J^ -h se/l. d* 4-7-oo) Ocdk «c*s styf«J a J Iter </M* S«*ickJ^ &< 
(jaltk iVpv*«/ -the ff-Pfic^i 04 ste U % ^ ^e <h*f ,'h Qjje* ™ ff-o$ 
ri4 U Styd «f r\*r r<'•&«€. >n iaMft U S^er^ ^ S Ufa ^ ^ «p +o 
fifi i L. - Aft /n ^ w* w w w *«& ^  ** 
AFFIDAVIT for Search Warrant, page 6. 
DATE SIGNED: fy^vJL 7f JosQ TIME SIGNED: {?\6 
i a n t // Aff 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / day of )LKUL^~ , t-99? 
Judge 
Addendum E 
2/00 Rich Co. Sheriff's Office 
9 Deputy Report Page: 
Incident: Search Warrant. 
Location: Randolph, UT 84064 
Other Information: On June 7, 2000, at around 3:00 P.M., I spoke 
Deputy Kim Clark from the Lincoln County Wyoming Sheriff's Office, 
ad also spoken to me the day before about a woman named Laura Dable. 
e has a trailer on West Park Street in Randolph. 
une 6, Officer Clark asked me if our officers could watch for Dable. 
aid that they had an informant that told them Dable was going to 
n to pick up some Marijuana and Methamphetamine to sell in Lincoln 
ty. He felt that they had enough information to make a traffic stop 
search the vehicle. We did not see Dable in Randolph that- ftvpnino. 
one 7, Officer Clark called to let me know that they had arrested 
e. At the time of the arrest, she had approximately 4 ounces of 
juana and 8 grams of Metha'mphetamine. They had also found some pay 
bs on her f-.hafc liflt-Pd S ^ P rliftnf.a in Randolph. Specifically John 
Sddie Cooper. Dable told Officer Kim Clark and Jodie Gardner that 
lad bought the drugs in Ogden, and then stopped at her trailer in 
Dlph before proceeding to Wyoming. 
in April, a man named Threll Orton was arrested in Evanston, 
Lng, for selling Methamphetamine and Marijuana. After the arrest 
nade by the Wyoming Officers, Officer Wayne Weston and I did a 
»nt search on Orton1s house. We found some paraphernalia and 
)ximately 14 ounces of Marijuana. Officer Weston and I spoke to 
I while he was still in jail. He told me that he had gotten the 
imphetamine he sold from a woman in Randolph named Laura. He also 
ribed where she live^i. The description fit Laura Dable1 s trailer on 
Street. This information seemed consistent with the information I 
receiving from Officers Kim Clark and Jodie Gardner. At that time I 
led to write a Search Warrant for Dable1s trailer in Randolph. 
lse of the lateness of the hour (around 6:00 p.m.), I asked Justice 
Judge Ross McKinnon to look over the warrant. I felt there was a 
chance that Dable would contact some of the people she had been 
.ng with and they would remove the evidence from the trailer if we 
t find it first. Judge McKinnon looked over and signed the 
int. 
the warrant was signed, Officer Mark Lee and I searched the 
er. We recovered 19 items. The list is as follows: 
baggie with a razer blade and residue from under the living room 
table. 
white plastic tube with residue from under the living room coffee 
ome green organic material (suspected Marijuana) from the glass top 
e living room coffee table. 
nother white plastic tube with residue inside. It was found on the 
f the living room coffee table. 
